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Construction Law
Brian J. Morrissey*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Last year's survey period focused on efforts to expand the passive
concealment doctrine in construction cases and the parameters of
arbitration under the Georgia Arbitration Code.
Substantively, with respect to expanding doctrines of fraud as they
pertain to construction projects, the courts rejected attempts to impose
liability for passive concealment in commercial settings. Historically,
the doctrine of passive concealment has been applied to residential
building relationships, but never in a commercial transaction. Part of
the impetus behind this move is the fact that in a typical construction
dispute involving economic damages, statutes of limitations begin to run
upon performance, rather than discovery. This antagonism to discovery
of concealed defects for purposes of limitations of actions carries over to
discovery of concealed frauds as well. An exception has been carved out
for residential home buyers who may not be in as good a position to
make the type of inspection that a commercial owner can.
In the arbitration field, there were a number of cases during the
survey period construing various portions of Georgia's recently adopted
arbitration code, fleshing out the respective rights of the parties as
governed by that code.
II.

LENDER DUTIES AND LIABILITIES

During the survey period, there were surprisingly no new developments or re-affirmations of existing doctrines concerning lender
involvement in construction projects.

* Principal in the firm of Richelo, Morrissey & Gould, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson
College (B.A., 1978); University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (J.D. with Honors, 1981).
Member, State Bars of Florida and Georgia.
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CONTRACT FORMATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND BREACH

ContractFormation

1. Form Contract Terms and Conditions. In Pioneer Concrete
Pumping Service v. T & B Scottdale Contractors, Inc.,' the plaintiff
subcontractor (Pioneer) provided concrete pumping services to T & B
Scottdale which performed as general contractor.2 During the performance of this work,*one of the braces supporting Pioneeer's truck gave
way, killing an employee of T & B Scottdale.'
Upon completion of the concrete pumping, Pioneer presented a form
"job ticket" to T & B Scottdale's site supervisor.4 On the reverse side of
the form were preprinted terms and conditions relating to responsibilities of lessees, delays, notice, waiver, and terms of payment. The terms
and conditions also included a provision stating that T & B Scottdale
would indemnify Pioneer "for any claim 'resulting from the performance
of this agreement,' unless the claim was the result of [Pioneer's] 'sole
negligence.' ' No reference was made on the front side of the "job
ticket" to the terms and conditions on the back.' Other identical "job
tickets" had been used on the project, signed by the same site supervisor
and others on behalf of T & B Scottdale, without any protest concerning
the terms on the back side. All of these "jobtickets" were paid by T &
B Scottdale.7
Pioneer entered into negotiations with the decedent's family,
eventually settling for a payment of $700,000.8 During the course of
these negotiations, Pioneer notified T & B Scottdale that negotiations
were occurring, but T & B Scottdale chose not to participate. 9
Pioneer sued T & B Scottdale on a claim for indemnity, and both
parties moved for summary judgment." T & B Scottdale's motion was
granted, and Pioneer appealed.'

1. 218 Ga. App. 596, 462 S.E.2d 627 (1995).
2. Id. at 596, 462 S.E.2d at 628.
3. Id.
4. Id. The signature line read: "The above Times and Quantities are Verified to be
Correct: BY
" Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.

11. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 628-29.
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The court of appeals reversed, holding that the "job ticket" was
sufficient to bind the signer to the terms and conditions on the reverse
side.12 In so holding, the court found that the site supervisor had an
obligation to read the terms and was bound by the terms he did not
read."' The court also rejected the argument that the terms and
conditions printed on the reverse side of a document rendered them
unenforceable."'

Likewise, the court found that T & B Scottdale's actions in paying
previous "job tickets" signed by this same site supervisor ratified the
supervisor's authority in signing this particular "job ticket." 5 Moreover, T & B Scottdale's project manager contacted the site supervisor
after the accident, indicating that the site supervisor's signature might
expose T & B Scottdale to liability."6 The project manager "then sent
[Pioneer] a letter stating T & B Scottdale would withhold certain funds
reflecting costs calculated to be attributable to the accident."17 At no
time did the project manager disclaim the site supervisor's authority to
sign the "job ticket," nor did he indicate that T & B Scottdale did not
consider itself bound by the indemnity provision."
2. Acceptance of Dedication. On a completely different issue of
contract formation, in Johnson & Harber Construction Co. v. Bing, 9 a
plaintiff property owner sued both the construction company that built
a drainage system on adjoining property, and Henry County, which had
taken steps to dedicate the system, alleging surface water runoff
damage. 20 Summary judgment was granted in favor of Henry County
from which the construction company appealed.2 1 Henry County moved
to dismiss the appeal.22

12. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 629.
13. Id. (citing Trulove v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 204 Ga. App. 362, 365,
419 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1992)).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 597, 462 S.E.2d at 629 (citing Holliday Constr. Co. v. Sandy Springs Ass'n,
198 Ga. App. 20, 21, 400 S.E.2d 380, 382 (1990)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 220 Ga. App. 179, 469 S.E.2d 697 (1996).
20. Id. at 179, 469 S.E.2d at 698.
21. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 698-99. After the contractor filed its notice of appeal, the
property owner and Henry County settled, and the property owner dismissed without
prejudice. Id.
22. Id, 469 S.E.2d at 699.
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In reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of Henry County,
the court found fact issues relating to acceptance of the dedication.'3
The evidence adduced at the trial court level consisted of a letter issued
by the county requiring the contractor to establish a two-year maintenance bond on construction of all streets, curbs, gutters, and storm
drainage structures in the particular subdivision in question. The letter
went on to state that Henry County would accept all future maintenance
of the subdivision.24 This expression of intent to take control by Henry
County was held to establish a fact question on acceptance of the
dedication.2"
B.

Contract Construction

1. Duty to Disclose Errors or Omissions Contained in Contract
Documents. In Armstrong Transfer & Storage Co. v. Mann Construction, Inc.,26 Armstrong operated a moving and storage business at 27a
location owned by Property Leasing IV, Inc., a related business.
Armstrong entered into an agreement to purchase certain real property
located in a Gwinnett County business park from Sam Leveto and Clay
Futch.28 Property Leasing, the holding company, entered into a
contract with Mann Construction for the construction of an office
warehouse facility on the property. Under the contract, Mann Construction procured a performance bond with Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company as the surety.'
"In late August or early September 1990, during the initial development of the property, [the] grading subcontractor discovered debris"
buried within the intended building area.'0 Leveto agreed that he and
Futch would pay $10,000 to remove the waste, but that this offer was
subject to approval by Futch. 3" No document was ever signed by Leveto
or Futch, but Leveto tendered to Armstrong and Property Leasing two
checks totalling
$14,000, plus a release in final settlement, which tender
2
was rejected.1

23. Id. at 181, 469 S.E.2d at 699.

24. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 700.
25. Id. at 182, 469 S.E.2d at 700.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

217 Ga. App. 538, 458 S.E.2d 481 (1995).
Id. at 538, 458 S.E.2d at 482.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 458 S.E.2d at 483.
Id.
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An excavation company removed the debris and the facility was
completed in the spring of 1991. By the fall of 1991, cracks appeared in
the club level of the building and substantial movement of walls
occurred on the backside of the warehouse as a result of movement in
the adjacent sloped ground.3 3 The roof of the facility began to leak, a
problem that Mann Construction was unsuccessful in eliminating.'
Fireman's Fund, the surety, denied the property owner's repeated
demands to correct the structural defects. 35
Armstrong and Property Leasing sued Leveto, Futch, and their
development company for negligence, breach of contract, and fraud.
They also sued Mann Construction and Fireman's Fund for fraud,
negligence, and breach of warranty.3 6 The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Property Leasing against Mann Construction and Fireman's
Fund in the amount of $180,000 for breach of contract in connection with
the roof, but against Property Leasing in connection with the structural
damage to the facility.3" Mann Construction was awarded $42,510 on
a counterclaim made against Property Leasing for construction of a
Post-trial motions were denied and
parking lot at the facility.3
Armstrong, Property Leasing, Mann Construction, and Fireman's Fund
all appealed. 9
In one aspect of these appeals, Armstrong and Property Leasing
contended that Mann Construction had an obligation to ensure that the
soil surrounding the construction site would support the constructed
facility and meet minimum load-bearing requirements.40 The court
held that while Mann Construction had an obligation to disclose errors
and omissions contained in the contract documents, such an obligation
did not include any failure to disclose to the project inspector the
in the
existence of a burial pit. Such duty was limited to errors found
41
contract itself, and not to external conditions found at the site.
2.
Conditions Precedent for Final Payment. In Grubb v.
Woodglenn Properties,Inc., 42 the court, in a case primarily concerning
materialmen's liens, addressed the failure of the contractor to provide

33. Id.
34.

Id.

35. Id. at 538-39, 458 S.E.2d at 483.
36. Id. at 539, 458 S.E.2d at 483.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 540, 458 S.E.2d at 484.
Id.
220 Ga. App. 902, 470 S.E.2d 455 (1996).
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fully executed affidavits as to liens and encumbrances as required by the
construction agreement's rider, and whether that failure precluded final
payment.' The court held that because the contractor had signed the
form provided to him by the construction lender, but did not have the
opportunity to execute that document properly before a notary public,
enforcement of the contract provisions requiring an affidavit would not
be justified."
C. Breach and Remedies
1. Excuse for Nonperformance. For the most part, nonperformance or breach by one party to a contract excuses the failure of the
other party to perform. In CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp.,45 Dravo
Corporation and WeyherfLivsey Constructors, Inc., (plaintiffs) were jointventure partners with defendant CRS Sirrine, Inc., in the construction
of a power plant for the United States Navy.46 CRS was a design
expert and had produced the technical proposal from which a bid on the
part of the joint venture was prepared.4 Plaintiffs prepared a bid
based upon these documents and were to be responsible for the actual
Numerous problems were encountered
construction of the project.
and plaintiffs sued defendant for deficiencies in the design documents,
breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, claiming losses
amounting to approximately $30,000,000."9 Under the terms of the
joint venture arrangement, the designer was to be paid a fee for its work
on the project and was to share in profits, but was not to bear any risk
of loss.'0

The trial court, in a bench trial, found defendant to have breached
contractual and fiduciary duties by failing to provide sufficient and
accurate information to plaintiffs, design the project within budgeted
quantities, and notify plaintiffs when significant increases over
estimated quantities occurred. Damages were awarded in the amount
of $5,518,812.51

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 902-05, 470 S.E.2d at 456-58.
Id. at 904, 470 S.E.2d at 457-58.
219 Ga. App. 301, 464 S.E.2d 897 (1995).
Id. at 301, 464 S.E.2d at 899.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301-02, 464 S.E.2d at 899.
Id. at 302, 464 S.E.2d at 899.
Id.
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CRS appealed. The trial court's determination was upheld,5 2 but the
court of appeals remanded for the trial court to clarify its findings
concerning how it arrived at the damages awarded. Defendant again
appealed from the trial court's clarification of its damage calculation
methodology."
On appeal, CRS contended that if its conduct caused a delay where the
plaintiffs' conduct also partially caused or contributed to the delay, it
would not be liable.5 4 The court found that if a party to a contract
makes it impossible for the other party to perform, then nonperformance
is excused.5" This doctrine, however, did not apply to instances where
both parties contribute to the delay, unless defendant's contribution to
delay was itself caused as a result of the plaintiffs' conduct."
IV.

A.

TORT LIABILITY

Fraud

1. Passive Concealment Doctrine. The Georgia Court of Appeals
had two occasions to address the passive concealment doctrine, and in
both instances held that the doctrine is limited to controversies between
residential homeowners and residential builder/sellers.
In Armstrong Transfer & Storage Co. v. Mann Construction, Inc.,5'
the vendor was sued for fraudulent concealment of buried debris.58 The
court held that the doctrine of passive concealment is limited to the sale
of residential properties, not commercial property.5 9 As this case
involved commercial property, the doctrine was not applicable.6' This
view also formed the basis of the court's holding in Crotts Enterprises,
Inc. v. John Payne Co.6

52. CRS Sirrine v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 445 S.E.2d 782 (1994).
53. 219 Ga. App. at 302, 464 S.E.2d at 899.
54. Id. at 303, 464 S.E.2d at 900. See State Highway Dep't v. MacDougald Constr. Co.,
102 Ga. App. 254, 264-65, 115 S.E.2d 863, 871 (1960); Bancroft v. Conyers Realty Co., 63
Ga. App. 106, 10 S.E.2d 286 (1940).
55. 219 Ga. App. at 304, 464 S.E.2d at 900.
56. Id. O.C.G.A. § 13-4-23 (1982), applicable in this instance, states: "If the nonperformance of a party to a contract is caused by the conduct of the opposite party, such conduct
shall excuse the other party from performance."
57. 217 Ga. App. 538, 458 S.E.2d 481 (1995). For more detailed treatment of this case,
see supra notes 26-41.
58. 217 Ga. App. at 540, 458 S.E.2d at 483-84.

59. Id. at 539-40, 458 S.E.2d at 483.
60. Id. at 539, 458 S.E.2d at 483.
61. 219 Ga. App. 173, 174, 464 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1995).
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In Sears Mortgage Corp. v.

Leeds Building Products,Inc.,62 Sears Mortgage and others purchased
or financed the purchase of certain homes from a residential builder,6 8
The builder had purchased materials on credit from Leeds Building
Products, executing security deeds on each of the properties to serve as
collateral for the construction materials.'
Upon the close of the purchase of the properties, plaintiffs had no
actual knowledge of the security deeds, and as a result, the security
deeds were not satisfied at that time.6" Subsequently, the builder could
not satisfy its debts to Leeds Building Products, which demanded that
plaintiffs satisfy the debts secured by the security deeds." Leeds
Building Products threatened foreclosure when plaintiffs refused.67
Plaintiffs sued Leeds Building Products to enjoin it from foreclosing on
the properties, and for damages resulting from fraud and wrongful
foreclosure.6" Leeds Building Products was granted summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed. Plaintiffs also contended that they
were entitled to summary judgment on their claims for fraud and
wrongful foreclosure. 9
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that "the trial court used an impermissibly narrow standard in assessing their fraud claim [arguing that] a
showing of fraud can be made without evidence of affirmative misrepresentations."7 ° While affirmative misrepresentation is not necessarily
required for a showing of fraud, that element must be satisfied by
evidence of suppression of a material fact or surprise.7 1 The court
found that the relationship between Leeds Building Products and the
72
builder was one of creditor/debtor, and did not amount to any fraud.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

219 Ga. App. 349, 464 S.E.2d 907 (1995), cert. granted.
Id. at 349, 464 S.E.2d at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351, 464 S.E.2d at 909.
Id.
Id. at 352, 464 S.E.2d at 910.

1996]
B.

CONSTRUCTION LAW

205

Fraud

1. Failure to Pay Not Conversion. In Doyle Dickerson Co. v.
Durden,73 a subcontractor on a construction project brought suit against
the general contractor for conversion of funds.74 Although the general
contractor had been paid in full by the project owner, it failed to remit
those amounts to the subcontractor, rather expending them to pay for
other expenses." The subcontractor failed to exercise its lien rights.76
The subcontractor contended that the funds paid to the general
contractor were "subject to a trust in favor of those who furnished labor7
and materials used in completing the improvements" to real property.
The subcontractor further contended that the president and sole owner
of the general contractor knowingly converted these trust funds due
plaintiff.7 The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis
that no viable claim for conversion existed because the subcontractor had
no title or right of possession to the funds received by the general
contractor. The subcontractor appealed from the grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment 80
The court noted that criminal statutes make it a felony for a contractor to divert monies earmarked for the payment of labor and services
performed, or materials furnished, under a contractor's order for specific
improvements to real property.8' Although cases construing the
criminal statute have used the words "trust" and "trustee," the court
found these references merely to describe the criminal offense. 2 The

218 Ga. App. 426, 461 S.E.2d 902 (1995).
Id. at 426, 461 S.E.2d at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426-27, 461 S.E.2d at 902.
Id. at 427, 461 S.E.2d at 902.
Id., 461 S.E.2d at 903.
Id. at 427-28, 461 S.E.2d at 903. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-15(a) (1982) provides:
Any architect, landscape architect, engineer, contractor, subcontractor, or other
person who with intent to defraud shall use the proceeds of any payment made to
him on account of improving certain real property for any other purpose than to
pay for labor or service performed on or materials furnished by his order for this
specific improvement while any amount for which he may be or become liable for
such labor, services, or materials remains unpaid, commits a felony ....
82. 218 Ga. App. at 428, 461 S.E.2d at 903. See Johnson v. State, 203 Ga. 147, 150-51,
45 S.E.2d 616, 619-20 (1947); Short & Paulk Supply Co. v. Dykes, 120 Ga. App. 639, 64647, 171 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1969).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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court further noted that this criminal statute did not give rise to a civil
cause of action, nor did it establish or create a property right in the
funds as the subcontractor contended.'
The court found that the
constructive trust fund doctrine is limited under general principles of
equity to instances in which persons are entitled to file liens under
Georgia's materialmen's lien laws. 4 By failing to file such a lien, the
subcontractor could not assert the doctrine.'
C. Negligence
1. Implied Contractual Provisions Giving Rise to Claim for
Negligence. In Seely v. Loyd H. Johnson Construction Co.,"8 residential home purchasers sued the builder/seller for negligent construction
or repair, breach of contract, breach of warranty, and strict liability.87
After moving into the residence, purchasers discovered water leaking
from the bathroom wall and notified the builder/seller who sent a
plumber to repair the leak. 8 Several days later, the repair failed, and
water again leaked from the hole causing personal injury to Ms.
Seely.89 Summary judgment was granted in favor of the builder/seller
for all claims of negligence from which the Seelys appealed.'
The court noted that the doctrine "of caveat emptor was abandoned in
cases involving latent defects in transactions between home buyers and
builder[/Isellers of new homes."9 ' A professional builder has a legal
duty to exercise a reasonable duty of care, skill, and ability, which,
under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances, others in
the profession ordinarily employ.' As a result, a builder/seller, having
held himself out as an expert to build a fit and workmanlike residence,
cannot escape liability simply by claiming that an independent
contractor he hired was responsible for that work.9 3 This duty is
premised upon the inference that abuilder/seller directs and controls the

83. 218 Ga. App. at 428, 461 S.E.2d at 903.
84. Id. at 427, 461 S.E.2d at 903 (citing In re American Building Consultants, 138 B.R.

1015, 1017 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)).
85. Id. at 428, 461 S.E.2d at 903.
86. 220 Ga. App. 719, 470 S.E.2d 283 (1996).
87. Id. at 719, 470 S.E.2d at 285.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 720, 470 S.E.2d at 286.
Id. (citing Williams v. Runion, 173 Ga. App. 54, 57, 325 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1984)).
Id. at 720-21, 470 S.E.2d at 286.
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work of all those employed by it to the extent that an ordinarily prudent
builder would exercise such direction and control in order to ensure a fit
and workmanlike structure. 94
2. Negligent Construction and Fraudulent Concealment. In
Florence v. Knight," plaintiffs filed an action for personal injuries96
against Knight Development and individual partners of that company.
One of the plaintiffs had fallen through the attic floor, which consisted
of blown insulation. Plaintiffs alleged inadequate lighting to discern
whether any solid flooring existed in that location. 7 The defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs
failed to establish a latent construction defect. Plaintiffs appealed the
grant of summary judgment.9 8
On appeal, the court of appeals found that the defect was not latent
and was certainly discoverable upon reasonable inspection."9 A
builder/seller of homes is not liable for damages resulting from negligent
construction in the absence of fraudulent concealment. 1' °
3. Limitation of Actions. In Parsons, Brinckerhoff Quade &
Douglas, Inc. v. Hardaway Co., ' "the Hardaway Company sued
Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade [and] Douglas, Inc., and DRC Consultants
...to recover.., economic losses incurred in [the] construction of ten
approach bridges for the Eugene Talnadge Memorial Bridge in
Savannah."0 2
Hardaway's central contention was that Parsons,
negligently
designed portions of the bridges, and it sought
Brinckerhoff
to recover for additional work and other expenses incurred when it had
to abandon these designs. 3 The defendant's motion for summary
judgment, in which it had argued that the suit was not filed within the
statute of limitations, was denied.y 4

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 721, 470 S.E.2d at 286.
217 Ga. App. 799, 459 S.E.2d 436 (1995).
Id. at 799, 459 S.E.2d at 437.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 800, 459 S.E.2d at 437.
Id., 459 S.E.2d at 438.
221 Ga. App. 74, 470 S.E.2d 904 (1996), cert. granted.

102. Id. at 74, 470 S.E.2d at 904.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 74-75, 470 S.E.2d at 904.
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Defendant's application for interlocutory appeal was granted as an
issue of first impression.'0 5 In reversing the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals
considered when a cause of action arises where a party seeks "recovery
for economic losses incurred as a result of alleged negligent misrepresentation."'0 6
Generally, a claim for negligent misrepresentation is
authorized under Georgia law.'0 7
The court reiterated that a cause of action accrues at that time when
plaintiff first could have maintained an action to a successful result.0"
In other words, the right of action accrues from the time there has been
a breach of duty, notwithstanding that actual damage has not yet
resulted. 9
The court found that a claim for negligent misrepresentation sounded
in negligence, not fraud, so the statute of limitations began to run when
there was a negligent act coupled with a proximately resulting injury."i' The court found the tort to be complete when the defendant
negligently supplied false information for the guidance of the plaintiff,
and when the plaintiff sustained a pecuniary loss caused to it by its
justifiable reliance upon that information."' In other words, the cause
of action accrues "when the [plaintiff] knew or should have known that
[it] had a loss caused by [its] reliance upon the defendant's information. 112
In this case, the date on which the plaintiff signed the contract with
the Department of Transportation is the time from which the statute
runs, because on that date the "causal means" test was met where
plaintiff could have first maintained its action to a successful result." 3
Thus, an action for damages accrued, not when plaintiff realized it had
and
been damaged, but when it first relied upon faulty information
114
contract.
its
under
act
to
obligated
became
or
monies
expended

105. Id. at 75, 470 S.E.2d at 904-05.
106. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 905.
107. Robert & Co. Assocs. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250 Ga. 680,300 S.E.2d 503
(1983).
108. 221 Ga. App. at 77, 470 S.E.2d at 905.
109. Id.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id., 470 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 78, 470 S.E.2d at 907.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 78-79, 470 S.E.2d at 907.
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V. MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
A.

Service of Claim of Lien on Property Owner

In Grubb v. Woodglenn Properties, Inc.,"' the builder, Woodglenn
Properties, brought suit for breach of contract involving the construction
of a home, and was awarded a judgment in rem and special lien based
upon its filed materialmen's lien." 6 On appeal, the property owner
contended that service requirements for claims of lien pursuant to the
materialmen's lien statute" 7 were not followed, inasmuch as he did not
receive a copy of the claim of lien by registered or certified mail, and
further, that the claimant's lien contained an inaccurate property
description."' The claim of lien was served with the complaint upon
the property owner's wife, which service the court found to have
The court also
exceeded the statutory minimum requirement." 9
rejected the argument concerning the inaccurate property description,
finding it to be correct in every respect, other than the plat book page
number 2 °
B.

InaccurateDescriptionof Real Property

Not all errors in property descriptions will be treated as lightly. In
Mull v. Mickey's Lumber & Supply Co., 2' the court of appeals was
asked to address whether an error in description of the real property
against which a claim of lien was made prevented enforcement of the
lien. 2'
Partial summary judgment had been granted in favor of
Mickey's Lumber and Supply Company, and the property owners
appealed. 23 This claim of lien was predicated upon the supplies
furnished for the construction of the property owner's home for which
there had never been payment.2 4 The property owners had purchased
lots twenty and twenty-one in the Camelot subdivision in Walton
County. The home was constructed on lot twenty-one because lot twenty

115. 220 Ga. App. 902, 470 S.E.2d 455 (1996). For additional discussion of this case,
see supra notes 42-44.
116. 220 Ga. App. at 902, 470 S.E.2d at 456.
117. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(a)(2) (1982).
118. 220 Ga. App. at 905, 470 S.E.2d at 458.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 218 Ga. App. 343, 461 S.E.2d 270 (1995).
122. Id. at 344, 461 S.E.2d at 272.
123. Id. at 343, 461 S.E.2d at 271.
124. Id.
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was deemed unfit for construction. Both lots were closed separately and
taxed independently.12 5 No construction whatsoever was performed on
lot twenty.126 The claim of lien indicated that the supplier had
furnished materials and labor for the improvement of property on lot
twenty, not lot twenty-one.1 27 The trial court found that all other
aspects of the description were accurate, and that the mere failure to
identify the appropriate lot owned by the same individuals, and
contiguous with the lot named in the claim of lien, did not render the
description legally insufficient to preclude enforcement of the lien.12
A right to claim of lien is in derogation of the common law and the
statute creating the right to such lien is strictly construed.' 29 The
court found that the legal description of the real property failed the test
for sufficiency of such a property description in a legal document.3 0
A description, in order to be valid, must identify the land or provide a
"key" to the description which may be found by extrinsic evidence.''
The court found that the information provided, even when aided by
extrinsic evidence, "fail[edl to lead definitely to the identification of lot
number 21 as the property subject to the lien."" 2 This unilateral
mistake on the part of the lien claimant rendered the lien unenforceable."
C. Liens Exceeding Total Contract Price
In Gaster Lumber Co. v. Browning,"M a supplier brought suit against
The property
property owners to foreclose on a materialmen's lien.'
owners entered into a construction contract with Gregory and Associates
for the construction of a residence in the amount of $243,830. Building
materials were purchased on account by the general contractor for use
at the project. Gaster Lumber filed a claim of lien after it failed to
The general contracreceive payment for supplies it had furnished.
tor was terminated for abandoning the project and the property owners
assumed the role of general contractor, expending additional sums of

125.

Id.

126. Id.
127.

Id. at 344, 461 S.E.2d at 272.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 345, 461 S.E.2d at 272.
130. Id. at 345-46, 461 S.E.2d at 273.

131.

Id. at 345, 461 S.E.2d at 273.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 346, 461 S.E.2d at 273.
Id.
219 Ga. App. 435, 465 S.E.2d 524 (1995), cert. granted.
Id. at 435, 465 S.E.2d at 525.
Id.
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money to complete the project, all of which were expended after the
filing of the lien.137 When
this occurred, $20,393.71 was still owed to
138
this particular supplier.

Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the supplier and entered
judgment in the amount of $36,714.70, consisting of the principal
balance of the lien, finance charges, prejudgment interest, and attorney
fees. However, upon determing that the aggregate of liens exceeded the
total contract price, the trial court reversed itself on a motion for new
trial and entered judgment in favor of the property owners. 3
In reversing the trial court's determination, the court of appeals noted
the lien statute requirement that the owner show that sums paid to the
contractor were properly appropriated to material and labor costs."
As a matter of law, payments made subsequent to the date of the filing
of the lien were not properly appropriated sums, and could not be
considered
in determining the total contract expenditure by the property
14
owner.

The court further found that prejudgment interest was an appropriate
element of the damage, but distinct and separate, and was not to be
included in determining whether the aggregate amount of liens exceeded
total contract price contemplated under the lien statute. 42 The court
also noted that, while the lien statute did not expressly provide for
attorney fees, if the statutory requirements for the award of attorney
fees in general were satisfied, fees could be awarded on a lien claim.143
VI.

SURETY BOND AND GUARANTOR ISSUES

A.

Dischargeof Surety
44
In Armstrong Transfer & Storage Co. v. Mann Construction, Inc.,
the court of appeals was also faced with a question concerning the

137. Id.

138. Id.

139. Id. O.C.G.A § 44-14-361.1(e) (1982) provides: "In no event shall the aggregate
amount of lien set up by Code Section 44-14-361 exceed the contract price of the
improvements made or services performed."
140. 219 Ga. App. at 437, 465 S.E.2d at 525.
141. Id., 465 S.E.2d at 526.
142. Id. at 438, 465 S.E.2d at 526.
143. Id. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982) generally allows attorney fees as part of the
expenses of litigation awarded under circumstances ofbad faith, stubborn litigiousness, and
unnecessary delay and expense.
144. 217 Ga. App, 538, 458 S.E.2d 481 (1995).
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discharge of the surety, Fireman's Fund.'4 5 On appeal, Fireman's
Fund contended that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against
it on its affirmative defenses of fraud and discharge."4 The surety
contended that the initial draft of the construction contract, upon which
it relied in making its decision to issue the performance bond, was
materially different from the final contract actually entered between its
principal and the project owner. Fireman's Fund argued this increased
its risk, thus entitling it to a discharge of its obligation under the
bond. 47
Typically, a surety may be discharged from its obligation under a bond
if its risk is increased by an act of the insured.148 Fireman's Fund
argued that by listing an individual as a joint general contractor, rather
than as a special agent for Mann Construction, its risk was increased.149 However, the evidence adduced at trial showed that Mann
Construction did not consider the superintendent to be a joint general
contractor, but merely its agent responsible for day-to-day decision
making on the project."' Moreover, the omission of this term in the
initial draft contract seen by Fireman's Fund did not amount to a
material misrepresentation concerning its risk, because Fireman's Fund
could not reasonably have relied upon an unsigned document as a true
representation of the contractual relationship it was insuring.'
VII.

A.

ARBITRATION

CompellingArbitration and Staying JudicialProceedings

1. Expression of Intent to Arbitrate. In Pinnacle Construction
Co. v. Osborne,"2 the purchasers of a home sued Pinnacle Construction
Company for defects in their house, alleging breach of contract, breach
of warranty, fraud, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.'
Pinnacle Construction moved to compel arbitration. This motion was
denied and an interlocutory appeal was taken.' Sales agreements for

145. Id. at 538, 458 S.E.2d at 481. For more details of the factual background of this
case, see supra notes 26-41, 57-60.
146. 217 Ga. App. at 542, 458 S.E.2d at 485.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 542-43, 458 S.E.2d at 485.
152. 218 Ga. App. 366, 460 S.E.2d 880 (1995).
153. Id. at 366, 460 S.E.2d at 881.
154. Id.
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the purchase or financing of residential real estate are exempt from
application of the Georgia Arbitration Code.' 55 The court of appeals
stated that the legislature is deemed to know that new houses were sold
by sales agreements containing provisions for the construction of the
Such a sales
house itself at the time it enacted this provision.'
agreement involving construction of a new home includes the implicit
promise that the house will be built in accordance with the specifications
that a suit for defects could be
named in the sales contract, and
157
maintained under that contract.
The parties to a sales agreement must initial the provision governing
arbitration in order to constitute an expression of their intent to be
bound by the provision. ' The court reasoned that new home buyers
should not be afforded less protection than purchasers of resold homes.' 9
2. Preemption. In North Augusta Associates Ltd. Partnershipv.
1815 Exchange, Inc.,'6° the court of appeals addressed whether parties
to a contract must comply with the arbitration provisions, including
whether a determination of arbitrability was for the trial court or the
arbitrators.'' North Augusta Associates entered into an agreement
with the contractor, Barge-Wagner, for construction of a project located
Barge-Wagner subsequently
in North Augusta, South Carolina. 62
6
The
general contract included
Exchange."
name
to
1815
changed its
an arbitration provision which recited conditions to occur prior to the
submission of any claim to arbitration. These conditions concerned

155. Id. at 367, 460 S.E.2d at 881. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(cX8) (1982) provides:
(c) This part shall apply to all disputes in which the parties thereto have agreed
in writing to arbitrate and shall provide the exclusive means by which agreements
to arbitrate disputes can be enforced, except the following, to which this part shall
not apply:
(8) Any sales agreement or loan agreement for the purchase or financing of
...
residential real estate unless the clause agreeing to arbitrate is initialled by all

signatories at the time of the execution of the agreement. This exception shall not
restrict agreements between or among real estate brokers or agents...
156. 218 Ga. App. at 367, 460 S.E.2d at 881.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 367-68, 460 S.E.2d at 881-82.
160. 220 Ga. App. 790, 469 S.E.2d 759 (1996).
161. Id. at 790, 469 S.E.2d at 760.
162. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 761.

163. Id.
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duties to be performed by the architect who would render a final
decision, subject to later arbitration.'I "
In November 1994, 1815 Exchange filed a demand for arbitration
against North Augusta and its general partners, claiming damages of
approximately $1.5 million." The defendants filed a Verified Petition
for Declaratory Judgment and a Motion for Stay of Arbitration in Cobb
County Superior Court.'
They contended that 1815 Exchange failed
to comply with the provisions of the agreement relating to the timing of
submission of written claims, and failed to comply with the conditions
precedent for demanding arbitration."7 The petition and motion for
stay were denied following the hearing." The trial court found that
the Federal Arbitration Act 69 preempted the Georgia Arbitration Code,
and that under said Act the arbitrators, not the trial court, were to
decide arbitrability. 7 °
The court found that while substantive portions of the Federal
Arbitration Act may apply to the case, that Act did not preempt the
entire field of arbitration, and that state procedural mechanisms
consistent with the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act were applicable. 7' The Federal Arbitration Act controls an agreement involving
interstate commerce.' 7 2 Choice of law provisions in documents,
however, govern the application of a state's arbitration code. 73 Even
if the Federal Arbitration Act would permit the arbitration to proceed,
whereas the state code would result in a stay of that arbitration, the
state's arbitration procedures will control. 74 State law applies,75so long
as that law does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act.

The court held that arbitration could not proceed unless the conditions
precedent agreed to by the parties in the contract were met. Failure to
uphold those conditions would circumvent the intent of the parties as
expressed at the time they entered into the agreement. 76 Unless the

164. Id.
165. Id. at 791, 469 S.E.2d at 761.

166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id.
169.
170.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1996).
220 Ga. App. at 791, 469 S.E.2d at 761.

171. Id.
172. Id. See ADC Constr. Co. v. McDaniel Grading, 177 Ga. App. 223,226, 338 S.E.2d
733, 737 (1985).

173. 220 Ga. App. at 791, 469 S.E.2d at 761. See Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of
Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
174. 220 Ga. App. at 791, 469 S.E.2d at 761.
175. Id. at 791-92, 469 S.E.2d at 762.
176. Id. at 792, 469 S.E.2d at 762.
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parties specifically agree to defer questions for arbitrability to the
arbitrators, under Georgia law, a court will decide questions of
arbitrability. "An agreement to arbitrate arbitrability must be shown by
clear, unmistakable evidence."177
B.

Procedure Under the Arbitration Code

1. Discovery Permitted in Confirmation Proceeding. In a
reversal of a case discussed in last year's annual survey, 7 ' the Georgia
Supreme Court determined that discovery is permitted in confirmation
proceedings. In Hardin Construction Group, Inc. v. Fuller Enterprises,
Inc., 1 the court considered whether any type of discovery would be
permitted in a confirmation proceeding. In the previous year, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held it was not. s0 In that case, the trial
court denied a motion for protective order. The court of appeals
that discovery should not be permitted, reversing the trial
determined
81
court.
The Georgia Supreme Court noted that confirmation proceedings
under the Georgia Arbitration Code are not civil actions.8 2 Such a
procedure is initiated by motion and requires that applications made
under the Code be heard and decided according to the rules provided for
the hearings of motions."s "Nevertheless, even though [a] confirmation proceeding is not a civil action, the Civil Practice Act chapter
The court concluded, however, that in
governing discovery applies."'
order not to frustrate the purpose of an arbitration proceeding, unlimited
discovery in an arbitration confirmation proceeding would not be
permitted, but limited discovery relating solely to affirmative defenses
to confirmation would be allowed. 8 5

177. Id. at 793,469 S.E.2d at 762-63 (citing First Options v. Manual Kaplan, 115 S. Ct.
1920 (1995)).
178. See Brian J. Morrissey, ConstructionLaw, 47 MERCER L. REV. 87, 114-15 (1995).
179. 265 Ga. 770, 462 S.E.2d 130 (1995).
180. See Fuller Enters., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Group, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 549, 451
S.E.2d 483 (1994), reu'd, 265 Ga. 770, 462 S.E.2d 130 (1995).
181. 265 Ga. at 770, 462 S.E.2d at 130.
182. Id. at 771, 462 S.E.2d at 131.
183. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4(a)(2) (1982).
184. 265 Ga. at 771, 462 S.E.2d at 131. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-81 (1982) provides: "This
chapter shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, except to the extent that specific
rules of practice and procedure... are expressly prescribed by law; but, in any event, the
provisions of [the Civil Practice Act] governing ... discovery... shall apply to all such

proceedings."
185. 265 Ga. at 772, 462 S.E.2d at 131.
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C. Scope of Arbitrator'sAuthority
1. Review of Arbitrator'sActual Findings Not Permitted. In
Hundley v. Greene," the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a claim
that an arbitrator's actual findings were not supported by evidence was
tantamount to challenging whether the arbitrator acted outside the
scope of his authority."' s The Georgia Supreme Court reversed this
decision in Greene v. Hundley.'" In doing so, the court noted that
arbitrating parties agree to waive certain rights in favor of a quick
resolution of their disputes when they agree to arbitrate."ls The
Georgia Arbitration Code does not require that an arbitrator enter
findings of fact in support of an award, nor does the Code require an
arbitrator to explain the reasoning behind an award." ° So long as the
award is derived from the context of a contract, the remedy fashioned is
within the inherent power of an arbitrator.1"9' If the parties agreed
that the arbitrator would resolve all existing disputes between them,
there is nothing in the record to support a finding that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority, as his findings are protected.19 2
The Georgia Supreme Court found that "the arbitration code providfed] the exclusive means by which contractual agreements to arbitrate
would be enforced."'93 This Code expressly provides that awards must
be confirmed unless vacated or modified in accordance with the Code
itself. " As a result, unless a statutory ground for vacating an award
is found in the Code, an award must be confirmed."9 5
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The survey period showed the focus on alternative dispute resolution
by strengthening in some areas, and curtailing in others, arbitration
rights governed under Georgia's Arbitration Code. Moreover, doctrines
designed to protect consumers in a consumer-oriented market were held

186.
(1996).
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

218 Ga. App. 193, 461 S.E.2d 250 (1995), rev'd, 266 Ga. 592, 468 S.E.2d 350
218 Ga. App. at 196, 461 S.E.2d at 253. See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) (1996).
266 Ga. 592, 468 S.E.2d 350 (1996).
Id. at 595, 468 S.E.2d at 352.
Id.
Id., 468 S.E.2d at 353.
Id. at 596, 468 S.E.2d at 353.
Id. at 595-96, 468 S.E.2d at 353.
Id. at 596, 468 S.E.2d at 353.
Id.
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not to reach into the commercial market where the parties are on more
equal footing.

